PART 1 - 02

The Template for the Archetypal Long-Term/Big Debt Cycle

The template that follows is based on my examination of 48 big debt cycles, which include all of the cases that led to real GDP falling by more than 3 percent in large countries (which is what I will call a depression). For clarity, I divided the affected countries into two groups: 1) Those that didn’t have much of their debt denominated in foreign currency and that didn’t experience inflationary depressions, and 2) those that had a significant amount of their debt denominated in foreign currency and did experience inflationary depressions. Since there was about a 75 percent correlation between the amounts of their foreign debts and the amounts of inflation that they experienced (which is not surprising, since having a lot of their debts denominated in foreign currency was a cause of their depressions being inflationary), it made sense to group those that had more foreign currency debt with those that had inflationary depressions.

我们将要提出的这个模型，是基于对48个发生在经济大国并导致真实GDP大跌3%（这种情况可以定义为萧条了）的大规模债务周期的研究得出的。为了更清楚地说明情况，我们将所有的国家分为两类：

1. 债务并非以外币占主导，未经历过通胀性萧条
2. 债务以外币的形式占主导，经历过通胀性萧条

由于外币债务的数额，和通胀的程度之间由75%的相关性（由于有大量的外币债务是导致通胀性萧条的原因之一），因此，将有大量外币债务和通胀性紧缩分组讨论很有必要

Typically debt crises occur because debt and debt service costs rise faster than the incomes that are needed to service them, causing a deleveraging. While the central bank can alleviate typical debt crises by lowering real and nominal interest rates, severe debt crises (i.e., depressions) occur when this is no longer possible. Classically, a lot of short-term debt cycles (i.e., business cycles) add up to a long-term debt cycle, because each short-term cyclical high and each short-term cyclical low is higher in its debt-to-income ratio than the one before it, until the interest rate reductions that helped fuel the expansion in debt can no longer continue. The chart below shows the debt and debt service burden (both principal and interest) in the US since 1910. You will note how the interest payments remain flat or go down even when the debt goes up, so that the rise in debt service costs is not as great as the rise in debt. That is because the central bank (in this case, the Federal Reserve) lowers interest rates to keep the debt-financed expansion going until they can’t do it any more (because the interest rate hits 0 percent). When that happens, the deleveraging begins.

一般来说，由于债务及其利息的增长速度过快，超过了收入的增长，进而引发了去杠杆，从而导致债务危机。央行能够通过降低真实利率及名义利率的方法来减轻典型的债务危机带来的影响，当降利率的方法无法生效时，就会爆发严重的债务危机（甚至引发萧条）。一般来说，许多短期的债务周期（如商业周期）会叠加为长期的债务周期。每一个短期周期的顶峰和谷底，及其债务/收入比都超过上一个周期，直到利率下跌对债务扩张的效果难以为继。下图中显示了1910年来，美国的债务及还款（本金&利息）负担。绿线代表利息，基本上保持较稳定，甚至在债务上升是它还会下跌，由此可见，利息的上升和债务的上升想不，并不是太大的问题。由于央行（比如美联储）降低利率来保持债务型金融的扩张，直到该方案无效为止（因为利率都降到0%了，自然再刺激也没用了）。如果这样的话，就需要开始去杠杆了。

p013-1.png

While the chart gives a good general picture, I should make clear that it is inadequate in two respects: 1) it doesn’t convey the differences between the various entities that make up these total numbers, which are very important to understand, and 2) it just shows what is called debt, so it doesn’t reflect liabilities such as pension and health care obligations, which are much larger. Having this more granular perspective is very important in gauging a country’s vulnerabilities, though for the most part such issues are beyond the scope of this book.

上图只是一个大概的描述，需要澄清两点：

1. 上图四条线中，只有汇总，没有详细列出细节数据
2. 上图只显示了什么是债务，而没有列举债务对养老金、社保等的影响

数据的粒度越小，对讨论一个国家是否陷入困境就越有帮助（虽然我们不准备讨论这些内容）

Our Examination of the Cycle

对周期的检视

In developing the template, we will focus on the period leading up to the depression, the depression period itself, and the deleveraging period that follows the bottom of the depression. As there are two broad types of big debt crises—deflationary ones and inflationary ones (largely depending on whether a country has a lot of foreign currency debt or not)—we will examine them separately.

在研究这套模型的过程中，我们会聚焦于以下时间段：导致萧条的时间段、萧条本身的时间段、以及在周期底部开始进行去杠杆过程的这一时间段。由于大型债务危机可以分为两类：通货紧缩型债务危机 & 通货膨胀型债务危机（主要取决于该国是否有大量的外币债务），让我们分别讨论吧

The statistics reflected in the charts of the phases were derived by averaging 21 deflationary debt cycle cases and 27 inflationary debt cycle cases, starting five years before the bottom of the depression and continuing for seven years after it.

上图中我们的数据统计，总共包含了21次通货紧缩型的债务危机，以及27次通货膨胀型的债务危机，始于大萧条（大萧条：1929 - 1933）谷底的前5年，终于大萧条（应该指的是2008年那场金融危机）结束的7年后

Notably long-term debt cycles appear similar in many ways to short-term debt cycles, except that they are more extreme, both because the debt burdens are higher and the monetary policies that can address them are less effective. For the most part, short-term debt cycles produce bumps—mini-booms and recessions—while big long-term ones produce big booms and busts. Over the last century, the US has gone through a long-term debt crisis twice—once during the boom of the 1920s and the Great Depression of the 1930s, and again during the boom of the early 2000s and the financial crisis starting in 2008.

长期债务周期的出现和短期债务周期有着诸多相似之处，不同的是它们更极端，主要是因为更重的债务负担，以及应对的货币政策不给力。短期债务周期会产生快速发展--小规模泡沫--衰退的循环，而长期债务周期会产生巨大的泡沫以及萧条。上个世纪，米国就经历过两次长期的债务危机——一次是在1920年代的繁荣以及随后1930年代的大萧条，另一次是2000年早期的互联网繁荣以及2008年开始的金融危机。

In the short-term debt cycle, spending is constrained only by the willingness of lenders and borrowers to provide and receive credit. When credit is easily available, there’s an economic expansion. When credit isn’t easily available, there’s a recession. The availability of credit is controlled primarily by the central bank. The central bank is generally able to bring the economy out of a recession by easing rates to stimulate the cycle anew. But over time, each bottom and top of the cycle finishes with more economic activity than the previous cycle, and with more debt. Why? Because people push it—they have an inclination to borrow and spend more instead of paying back debt. It’s human nature. As a result, over long periods of time, debts rise faster than incomes. This creates the long-term debt cycle.

在短期债务周期中，限制消费的因素只有借贷双方提供信贷的意愿。如果信用容易获取，则经济开始扩张，反之亦然。信用主要由央行来进行控制，央行通过松动市场将经济带出衰退从而进入一个新的增长周期。但随着时间的推移，每一个周期的顶部和底部和前一个周期相比，有更多的经济活动，以及更多的债务。为什么会这样呢？因为消费者们的刺激：消费者总是倾向于借债消费（房贷/车贷/消费分期贷等等等），这是人性所在。而最终结果就是长期以往，债务增长得比收入要快，从而产生长期债务周期。

During the upswing of the long-term debt cycle, lenders extend credit freely even as people become more indebted. That’s because the process is self-reinforcing on the upside—rising spending generates rising incomes and rising net worths, which raises borrowers’ capacities to borrow, which allows more buying and spending, etc. Most everyone is willing to take on more risk. Quite often new types of financial intermediaries and new types of financial instruments develop that are outside the supervision and protection of regulatory authorities. That puts them in a competitively attractive position to offer higher returns, take on more leverage, and make loans that have greater liquidity or credit risk. With credit plentiful, borrowers typically spend more than is sustainable, giving them the appearance of being prosperous. In turn, lenders, who are enjoying the good times, are more complacent than they should be. But debts can’t continue to rise faster than the money and income that is necessary to service them forever, so they are headed toward a debt problem.

长期债务周期的上升期中，贷方（银行，金融机构等）愿意为借方提供源源不断的贷款。这是因为在上升期中这个过程会自我增强：更高的消费 — 更高的收入 — 更高的资产，从而让借方有能够借更多的资金，然后继续去买买买或者消费，几乎人人都愿意承担风险去借钱（参考过去十年买房就是上车）。在这个阶段中也会源源不断有新的金融机构或者新的金融工具（P2P，小额贷款等）在监管之外的领域冒出来。这些机构提供超级有吸引力的高收益，采用高杠杆来开展高流动性高风险放贷业务。信用泛滥时，人们借的钱比赚的多，造成表面上的繁荣，而放贷的也灰常happy，灰常灰常地happy。然而债务不可能总是维持这超过货币和收入增长速度的增长的，总有一天这些债务会出问题的。

When the limits of debt growth relative to income growth are reached, the process works in reverse. Asset prices fall, debtors have problems servicing their debts, and investors get scared and cautious, which leads them to sell, or not roll over, their loans. This, in turn, leads to liquidity problems, which means that people cut back on their spending. And since one person’s spending is another person’s income, incomes begin to go down, which makes people even less creditworthy. Asset prices fall, further squeezing banks, while debt repayments continue to rise, making spending drop even further. The stock market crashes and social tensions rise along with unemployment, as credit and cash-starved companies reduce their expenses. The whole thing starts to feed on itself the other way, becoming a vicious, self-reinforcing contraction that’s not easily corrected. Debt burdens have simply become too big and need to be reduced. Unlike in recessions, when monetary policies can be eased by lowering interest rates and increasing liquidity, which in turn increase the capacities and incentives to lend, interest rates can’t be lowered in depressions. They are already at or near zero and liquidity / money can’t be increased by ordinary measures.

相对于收入的增长，当债务增长速度达到极限时，整个过程开始反转。资产价格下跌（2018下半年股市暴跌），借债的资不抵债，投资人陷入恐慌，开始抛售资产，或者停止他们的放出的贷款（银行貌似最近开始催公司还款了）。这又进一步导致了流动性问题，人们开始消减支出。由于A的支出就是B的收入（这点好理解，你去买一件衣服，你的支出不就是商家的收入么），支出减少自然会导致收入的减少，又进一步限制了人们的信用（废话，你之前一个月2万，银行评估贷款200W，现在一个月只有1W，银行评估贷款就只能放100W了）。资产开始下跌，进一步挤压银行。随着人们纷纷把手中的钱去还债，可支配的收入下降的更厉害。股市暴跌，失业率上升，公司也跟着降成本。整个经济开始反转，进入自我增强的下降期，债务负担过于沉重。

和衰退不同，通过宽松的货币政策、降低利率从而增加流动性等手段可以增强社会借贷的意愿。在萧条期中，无法通过降低利率来刺激经济，因为基本上已经到零利率了，也无法通过常规手段来增加流动性。

This is the dynamic that creates long-term debt cycles. It has existed for as long as there has been credit, going back to before Roman times. Even the Old Testament described the need to wipe out debt once every 50 years, which was called the Year of Jubilee. Like most dramas, this one both arises and transpires in ways that have reoccurred throughout history.

这就是长期的债务危机如何形成的，债务危机从古罗马时代人们发明信用以来就一直存在于我们的历史中。甚至在《圣经·旧约》就有关于每五十年需要清空债务的描写，每次清空债务的时间成为“禧年”。债务危机，古自有之。

Remember that money serves two purposes: it is a medium of exchange and a store hold of wealth. And because it has two purposes, it serves two masters: 1) those who want to obtain it for “life’s necessities,” usually by working for it, and 2) those who have stored wealth tied to its value. Throughout history these two groups have been called different things—e.g., the first group has been called workers, the proletariat, and “the have-nots,” and the second group has been called capitalists, investors, and “the haves.” For simplicity, we will call the first group proletariat-workers and the second group capitalists-investors. Proletariat-workers earn their money by selling their time and capitalists-investors earn their money by “lending” others the use of their money in exchange for either a) a promise to repay an amount of money that is greater than the loan (which is a debt instrument), or b) a piece of ownership in the business (which we call “equity” or “stocks”) or a piece of another asset (e.g., real estate). These two groups, along with the government (which sets the rules), are the major players in this drama. While generally both groups benefit from borrowing and lending, sometimes one gains and one suffers as a result of the transaction. This is especially true for debtors and creditors.

货币有两个作用：1). 交易的中介物，2). 以及存储财富。而正因为它有两个功能，因此它也服务于两类人：1). 将它作为生活必需品，通过劳动获取货币的人群，2). 有大量财富需要锚定其价值的人群。在历史中，这两类人有着不同的称谓：第一类人通常被称为工人、无产阶级、穷人等；第二类人通常被称为资本家、投资者、或富人。简单起见，本书中将第一类人称为工人-无产阶级，将第二类人称为资本家-投资者。工人通过出卖他们的时间来赚钱，资本家-投资者通过把自己的钱“借给”他人，并进行约定 1). 未来某个时间点偿还超过本金的金额（本金+利息），或者 2). 获得商业所有权的一部分（股权/股票）或其他资产（地产等）。这两类人，同政府（制定规则）一起，构成了社会的主体。通常来说，两类人都能够通过借款/放贷得到收益，当然，有时候是一方赚一方亏。

One person’s financial assets are another’s financial liabilities (i.e., promises to deliver money). When the claims on financial assets are too high relative to the money available to meet them, a big deleveraging must occur. Then the free-market credit system that finances spending ceases to work well, and typically works in reverse via a deleveraging, necessitating the government to intervene in a big way as the central bank becomes a big buyer of debt (i.e., lender of last resort) and the central government becomes a redistributor of spending and wealth. At such times, there needs to be a debt restructuring in which claims on future spending (i.e., debt) are reduced relative to what they are claims on (i.e., money).

A的金融资产就是B的金融负债（承诺支付给对方)，当金融资产的债权太贵了，那么则必须经历去杠杆的过程（想到了我天朝的房产）接下来自由市场中，支持源源不断消费的信用系统停转，甚至开始通过去杠杆化反作用，使得政府开始大力干预，央行充当整体债务的最大买家，中央政府开始对财富进行重分配。这时，需要对债务进行重组，使得债务下降至合理水平。

This fundamental imbalance between the size of the claims on money (debt) and the supply of money (i.e., the cash flow that is needed to service the debt) has occurred many times in history and has always been resolved via some combination of the four levers I previously described. The process is painful for all of the players, sometimes so much so that it causes a battle between the proletariat-workers and the capitalists-investors. It can get so bad that lending is impaired or even outlawed. Historians say that the problems that arose from credit creation were why usury (lending money for interest) was considered a sin in both Catholicism and Islam.

货币需求（债务）和货币供给（债务的成本）之间的失衡在历史上已经发生多次了，并且总是通过之前提到的四种杠杆的组合来解决的。这个过程对每个人都是痛苦的，甚至会引发无产阶级和资产阶级的斗争，甚至贷款都称为一种非法行为。历史学家也提出，信用所导致的这个问题也说明了为什么在天主教和穆斯林的教义中，放贷都是一种罪恶。

In this study we will examine big debt cycles that produce big debt crises, exploring how they work and how to deal with them well. But before we begin, I want to clarify the differences between the two main types: deflationary and inflationary depressions.

本书中，我们会研究产生重大债务危机的债务周期，探索他们是如何运作的以及如何处理。但在开始前，要了解紧缩性的经济萧条和通货膨胀性的经济萧条，这两者的区别

• In deflationary depressions, policy makers respond to the initial economic contraction by lowering interest rates. But when interest rates reach about 0 percent, that lever is no longer an effective way to stimulate the economy. Debt restructuring and austerity dominate, without being balanced by adequate stimulation (especially money printing and currency depreciation). In this phase, debt burdens (debt and debt service as a percent of income) rise, because incomes fall faster than restructuring, debt paydowns reduce the debt stock, and many borrowers are required to rack up still more debts to cover those higher interest costs. As noted, deflationary depressions typically occur in countries where most of the unsustainable debt was financed domestically in local currency, so that the eventual debt bust produces forced selling and defaults, but not a currency or a balance of payments problem.

在紧缩型的经济萧条中：政府一开始的应对措施是降低利率，但当利率降到0%附近，再降低也无法刺激经济了。债务调整，消费下降，也没有适当的经济刺激措施（特别是印钱或者货币贬值）。在这个阶段中，由于收入急剧下降，债务负担（债务及利息占收入%）居高不下，甚至不少人需要借新债还旧债。紧缩性的经济萧条通常发生在主要债务成分是由本币构成的国家（1. 美国，它可以全球发放债券，所以它的债务基本上都是本币/美元债务，2. CN，不像美国可以发债，所以只能发CNY在国内消化自己的债务），最终债务的飙升会造成被迫抛售以及违约，

• Inflationary depressions classically occur in countries that are reliant on foreign capital flows and so have built up a significant amount of debt denominated in foreign currency that can’t be monetized (i.e., bought by money printed by the central bank). When those foreign capital flows slow, credit creation turns into credit contraction. In an inflationary deleveraging, capital withdrawal dries up lending and liquidity at the same time that currency declines produce inflation. Inflationary depressions in which a lot of debt is denominated in foreign currency are especially difficult to manage because policy makers’ abilities to spread out the pain are more limited.

通胀性经济萧条一般发生在严重依靠外币，而且其债务也主要是由外币构成的国家（津巴布韦，还有我们的老朋友，委内瑞拉，呵呵）。外币的现金流一旦降低，信用就从上升趋势反转进入下降趋势。在通胀性的去杠杆过程中，资本的出逃导致借款的枯竭，同时流动性变差，从而产生通胀。这种通胀性萧条非常难解决，因为政府很难把问题转移出去（解决问题无非就是两种转移途径，一种是将本国的问题转移到他国，如美国，全球人们共同承担他们家的经济危机；另一种是将本国的问题转移到未来，欠的账以后慢慢还，如我朝）

We will begin with deflationary depressions.

先从紧缩型萧条开始吧