How did Australia get Beijing so

Shanghai| When Australia and China celebrated 40 years of diplomatic relations in 2012, the gala dinner in Beijing was notable for treasurer Wayne Swan’s mispronunciation of the name of every Chinese dignitary in the room.

But while the treasurer’s lack of tonal precision caused some gnashing of teeth that night, it was also viewed somewhat endearingly as striving hard to engage and connect with China.

That perception was only strengthened by Treasury secretary, Martin Parkinson, going aphonic from the sheer volume of talking and drinking required during the visit.

What followed was a period of heightened diplomatic traffic culminating in the Gillard government signing an upgraded strategic partnership in 2013, then a free trade deal coming into effect under then prime minister Tony Abbott two years later. Since then the relationship has largely gone cold.

Malcolm Turnbull, with Chinese President Xi Jinping at APEC, was last on the Chinese mainland 14 months ago. 

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has not visited China for 20 months and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was last on the mainland to attend the G20 summit 14 months ago.

Such absences tell you everything you need to know about the state of the diplomatic relationship, even when taking into account the visit of Premier Li Keqiang to Australia in March.

To say the relationship is strained would be a giant understatement. It’s no surprise, therefore, celebrations next week to mark the 45th anniversary of relations with Communist China will be modest.

A lunch, rather than a gala dinner, is planned at the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing, and there will be no minister or even parliamentarian in attendance from Australia.

Sure, 45 years isn’t as roundly auspicious as 40 years, but the low-key nature of the party also reflects how quickly the relationship has unravelled.

Blame for this can be attributed to both sides. Beijing’s behaviour in the South China Sea is impossible to ignore and its interference in Australian domestic affairs has also hardened attitudes towards Beijing and made it difficult for both sides of politics to champion greater engagement.

But Canberra can’t be excused either.

The view from Shanghai is of a government relishing its new ‘‘getting tough on China’’ rhetoric and patting itself on the back for ‘‘standing up to China’’.

That might make all involve feel better, but it’s hard to see how it actually advances the national interest.

Australia appears to view every issue regarding China as a test of strength. This stance requires not giving any ground or ‘‘face’’ to China lest we be considered weak.

That might explain why Bishop has stayed away from China for so long.

It also hints at Australia’s reluctance to formally sign up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), even though others with similar strategic concerns have opted in.

Such gestures, and that’s all they are, would cost Australia nothing while smoothing out some of the hard edges in the relationship.

Thesegestureswouldthengive Australiagreaterstandingtoexplain whywewon’tbendonmajorissuesof principallikedemocracy,theruleoflaw, freedomofexpressionandthemeddling ofaforeignstateindomesticaffairs.

Surprisingly, Donald Trump appears to understand this.

The US President came to Beijing last month where he lavished praise on the Chinese, but more importantly showed them face and respect. Wise heads in the administration are now hoping this will infuse sufficient ballast into the relationship at a leadership level to ride out the inevitable rocky times ahead on trade and North Korea.

But this strategy requires turning up, something Australian politicians, with the exception of Trade Minister Steve Ciobo, have done infrequently of late.

Next year’s Australia Week in Shanghai, slated for May, is looming as the next opportunity to reset the relationship, which despite the current differences remains our most important in the region.

And it should be remembered the cost of getting it wrong is not small. While China will continue to buy our iron ore even if relations remain rocky, the same can’t be said for tourism or education.

These two industries accounted for nearly $10 billion in exports to China in the year to June 30, but are vulnerable to a change in perception from China’s middle class. If that group gradually sees Australia as either hostile or generally unfriendly to Chinese people, with a little help from the state media, then those dollars may not flow as quickly as before or even fall away.

That’swhyit’simportantfor Australianpoliticianstokeepturning upinChina, whateverourdifferences, andwhatbetter opportunitythanan uncontroversialanniversarynextweek.

As Australia’s first ambassador to China,Stephen Fitz Gerald, reminded us during his Whitlam Oration in May:‘‘We are living in a Chinese world. But we don’t have a relationship to match it.’’