Linux内核漏洞利用之CISCN2017-babydriver
2019-05-17 本文已影响11人
bsauce
一、代码分析:
//babyioctl:定义了 0x10001 的命令,可以释放全局变量 babydev_struct 中的 device_buf,再根据用户传递的 size 重新申请一块内存,并设置 device_buf_len。
void __fastcall babyioctl(file *filp, unsigned int command, unsigned __int64 arg)
{
size_t v3; // rdx
size_t v4; // rbx
__int64 v5; // rdx
_fentry__(filp, *(_QWORD *)&command);
v4 = v3;
if ( command == 0x10001 )
{
kfree(babydev_struct.device_buf);
babydev_struct.device_buf = (char *)_kmalloc(v4, 0x24000C0LL);
babydev_struct.device_buf_len = v4;
printk("alloc done\n", 0x24000C0LL, v5);
}
else
{
printk("\x013defalut:arg is %ld\n", v3, v3);
}
}
//babyopen: 申请一块空间,大小为 0x40 字节,地址存储在全局变量 babydev_struct.device_buf 上,并更新 babydev_struct.device_buf_len
int __fastcall babyopen(inode *inode, file *filp)
{
__int64 v2; // rdx
_fentry__(inode, filp);
babydev_struct.device_buf = (char *)kmem_cache_alloc_trace(kmalloc_caches[6], 0x24000C0LL, 0x40LL);
babydev_struct.device_buf_len = 64LL;
printk("device open\n", 0x24000C0LL, v2);
return 0;
}
//babyread: 先检查长度是否小于 babydev_struct.device_buf_len,然后把 babydev_struct.device_buf 中的数据拷贝到 buffer 中,buffer 和长度都是用户传递的参数
void __fastcall babyread(file *filp, char *buffer, size_t length, loff_t *offset)
{
size_t v4; // rdx
_fentry__(filp, buffer);
if ( babydev_struct.device_buf )
{
if ( babydev_struct.device_buf_len > v4 )
copy_to_user(buffer, babydev_struct.device_buf, v4);
}
}
//babywrite: 类似 babyread,不同的是从 buffer 拷贝到全局变量中
void __fastcall babywrite(file *filp, const char *buffer, size_t length, loff_t *offset)
{
size_t v4; // rdx
_fentry__(filp, buffer);
if ( babydev_struct.device_buf )
{
if ( babydev_struct.device_buf_len > v4 )
copy_from_user(babydev_struct.device_buf, buffer, v4);
}
}
//babyrelease: 释放空间,没什么好说的
int __fastcall babyrelease(inode *inode, file *filp)
{
__int64 v2; // rdx
_fentry__(inode, filp);
kfree(babydev_struct.device_buf);
printk("device release\n", filp, v2);
return 0;
}
二、漏洞分析及利用
漏洞:由于babydev_struct是全局变量,若同时打开两个设备,释放第一个,第二设备的babydev_struct仍指向第一个设备的空间,造成UAF。
利用:之前提到了 cred 结构体,可以修改 cred 来提权到 root。
- 打开两次设备,通过 ioctl 更改其大小为 cred 结构体的大小。
- 释放其中一个,fork 一个新进程,那么这个新进程的 cred 的空间就会和之前释放的空间重叠。
- 同时,我们可以通过另一个文件描述符对这块空间写,只需要将 uid,gid 改为 0,即可以实现提权到 root。
//cred结构如下:
struct cred {
atomic_t usage; 4
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
atomic_t subscribers; /* number of processes subscribed */
void *put_addr;
unsigned magic;
#define CRED_MAGIC 0x43736564
#define CRED_MAGIC_DEAD 0x44656144
#endif
kuid_t uid; /* real UID of the task */ 4
kgid_t gid; /* real GID of the task */ 4
kuid_t suid; /* saved UID of the task */ 4
kgid_t sgid; /* saved GID of the task */ 4
kuid_t euid; /* effective UID of the task */ 4
kgid_t egid; /* effective GID of the task */ 4
kuid_t fsuid; /* UID for VFS ops */ 4
kgid_t fsgid; /* GID for VFS ops */ 4
unsigned securebits; /* SUID-less security management */ 4
kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable; /* caps our children can inherit */ 4
kernel_cap_t cap_permitted; /* caps we're permitted */ 4
kernel_cap_t cap_effective; /* caps we can actually use */ 4
kernel_cap_t cap_bset; /* capability bounding set */ 4
kernel_cap_t cap_ambient; /* Ambient capability set */ 4
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested
* keys to */ 1
struct key __rcu *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */
struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */
struct key *thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */
struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
void *security; /* subjective LSM security */ 8
#endif
struct user_struct *user; /* real user ID subscription */
struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */
struct group_info *group_info; /* supplementary groups for euid/fsgid */
struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */
};
需要确定 cred 结构体的大小,有了源码,大小就很好确定了。计算一下是 0xa8(注意使用相同内核版本的源码)。其实是很难计算出来的,可以写个驱动算出来:
//简单modules
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
struct cred c1;
static int hello_init(void)
{
printk("<1> Hello world!\n");
printk("size of cred : %d \n",sizeof(c1));
return 0;
}
static void hello_exit(void)
{
printk("<1> Bye, cruel world\n");
}
module_init(hello_init);
module_exit(hello_exit);
dmesg输出
[18370.393751] <1> Hello world!
[18370.393753] size of cred : 168
[18610.595999] <1> Bye, cruel world